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SINGAPORE PROPERTY TAX LAW AS IT STANDS 
The Rebus Sic Stantibus Principle and the Statutory Formula 
The Singapore jurisprudence appears to have adopted the 
proposition that the rebus sic stantibus principle is to be 
disapplied where s 2(3) of the Singapore Property Tax Act 
(Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed) is applied. This article argues that 
this proposition perhaps ought to be stated more precisely. 
The principle is only disapplied where s 2(3)(b) is applied 
because it would run contrary to the statutory fiction 
imposed by s 2(3)(b) that the land is to be valued as if it were 
vacant land. There should be no disapplication of the 
principle where s 2(3)(a) is applied due to the absence of any 
such conflict. In practice, the Chief Assessor and courts 
appear to have implicitly recognised this. However, the 
recent “Swiss Club case” (HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v 
Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax [2018] 
SGVRB 2) might have departed from this by disapplying the 
principle when s 2(3)(a) was applied. This provides an 
opportune moment to clarify the underlying proposition and 
its rationale. 
Vincent OOI* 
BA (Oxon); 
Lecturer, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 The rebus sic stantibus principle is an objective principle in 
property valuation that property should be valued as it stands, and as 
used and occupied when the assessment is made.1 It is an established 
principle of English origin2 which has been affirmed in Singapore on 
several occasions.3 Section 2(3) of the Singapore Property Tax Act4 
 
* The author is extremely grateful to Liu Hern Kuan and Leung Yew Kwong for 
generously sharing their considerable experience in this area. The author would 
also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. 
1 Great Western and Metropolitan Railway Co v Hammersmith Assessment 
Committee [1916] 1 AC 23 at 54. 
2 Dating back to at least as far as the middle of the 19th century. See Guy Roots, Ryde 
on Rating and the Council Tax (LexisNexis, 14th Ed, 2018) at p 268. 
3 For example, Chief Assessor v Howe Yoon Chong [1983–1984] SLR(R) 657; 
Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521; and Chief Assessor v 
Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339. 
4 Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed. 
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(“PTA”) (“the Statutory Formula”) is of local origin5 and allows the 
Chief Assessor to deem the annual value of a property to be 5% of the 
value of either (a) the estimated value of the property, including any 
buildings thereon; or (b) the estimated value of the land as if it were 
vacant land. Following the decisions of the Singapore Court of Appeal 
in Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd6 (“Glengary”) and Aspinden 
Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor7 (“Aspinden”), it appears that there is a 
legal principle that the rebus sic stantibus principle is to be disapplied 
where the Statutory Formula is invoked by the Chief Assessor.8 This 
principle is supported by a string of cases before the Valuation Review 
Board (“VRB”), one decided before9 Glengary and Aspinden, and two 
decided after10 them. 
2 While this legal principle has generally been formulated in 
broad terms to apply whenever the Statutory Formula is invoked, it 
bears remembering that the Statutory Formula has two limbs and the 
question arises whether the legal principle should apply to both limbs. 
Following the reasoning in Glengary, when s 2(3)(b) of the PTA is 
invoked by the Chief Assessor, the rebus sic stantibus principle must be 
disapplied because it runs contrary to the statutory fiction that the land 
is to be valued as if it were vacant land.11 However, the rebus sic 
stantibus principle appears to be perfectly capable of co-existing with 
s 2(3)(a) of the PTA, which allows a property to be valued including any 
buildings thereon. Indeed, a careful reading of Glengary12 and 
Aspinden13 suggests that these cases may support the proposition that 
the rebus sic stantibus principle may continue to apply where s 2(3)(a) 
of the PTA is invoked. Applying the (incorrect) broad principle that the 
rebus sic stantibus principle must be disapplied where s 2(3) of the PTA 
is invoked may not cause injustice in a situation where s 2(3)(b) of the 
PTA is invoked. In such a case, the principle is merely imprecisely 
stated. However, where s 2(3)(a) of the PTA is invoked instead, as in the 
recent case of HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and 
 
5 Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015) at p 323. 
6 [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [20]. 
7 [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [36]. 
8 See Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 16 (“Revenue and Taxation – Other Taxes”) 
(LexisNexis, 2018 Reissue) at para 200.584; and Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei 
Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2015) at p 137. 
9 Poh Hee Construction Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor (1992) 1 MSTC 5100 at 5102. 
10 The Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2015] SGVRB 1; HSBC 
Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax [2018] 
SGVRB 2. 
11 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [20]. 
12 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [20]. 
13 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [36]. 
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Comptroller of Property Tax14 (“the Swiss Club case”), the issue of 
precisely when the rebus sic stantibus principle must be disapplied 
becomes a material one as it affects the basis on which land is valued 
under s 2(3) of the PTA. 
3 This article aims to establish the propositions raised above: that 
the rebus sic stantibus principle ought to be disapplied only where it 
runs contrary to a statutory fiction, which would be the case where 
s 2(3)(b) of the PTA is applied, but not s 2(3)(a). It would appear that in 
practice, an implicit distinction is drawn between the cases where 
ss 2(3)(a) and 2(3)(b) are applied. The proposition is not applied in its 
general (broad) form, but rather, correctly applied in that the rebus sic 
stantibus principle is only disapplied where s 2(3)(b) is applied, and still 
applied where s 2(3)(a) is applied. However, in the recent Swiss Club 
case, it appears that the rebus sic stantibus principle was disapplied even 
though s 2(3)(a) of the PTA was applied.15 In light of this, it may be an 
opportune moment to consider the theoretical foundations of the 
proposition itself and clearly state its scope. 
4 Following this introduction, Part II16 lays out the law on the 
rebus sic stantibus principle and how it has been applied in Singapore. 
Part III17 goes on to briefly analyse the Statutory Formula. Part IV18 
considers the particular issue of the interaction between the rebus sic 
stantibus principle and the Statutory Formula in the Singapore 
jurisprudence, tracing its development over time, and ultimately 
submitting that the conflict is really between the rebus sic stantibus 
principle and s 2(3)(b) of the PTA, but not s 2(3)(a). 
II. The rebus sic stantibus principle 
5 The rebus sic stantibus principle is an objective principle which 
states that a property should be valued as it stands, and as used and 
occupied.19 The principle, used in property valuation, aids in identifying 
comparable properties (for which actual valuation data exists), so as to 
provide an “anchor” for valuing the subject property (“the anchor 
 
14 [2018] SGVRB 2 at [30]. In the interests of full disclosure, the author would like to 
declare that he was involved in the Swiss Club case as a trainee to the appellant’s 
counsel. Nevertheless, the views contained herein represent his honest analysis of 
the legal position. 
15 HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax 
[2018] SGVRB 2 at [30]. 
16 See paras 5–25 below. 
17 See paras 26–29 below. 
18 See paras 30–84 below. 
19 Great Western and Metropolitan Railway Co v Hammersmith Assessment 
Committee [1916] 1 AC 23 at 54. 
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valuation”), as well as in determining the need for and extent of 
adjustments to be made to said anchor valuation to derive the annual 
value20 of the subject property. There are two limbs to the rebus sic 
stantibus principle. The first limb relates to the physical state of the 
subject property, and the second limb relates to the use of the subject 
property.21 
A. The first limb 
6 The first limb of rebus sic stantibus requires that “matters 
affecting the physical state or physical enjoyment” of the property be 
considered at the valuation date.22 Comparable properties would thus 
be those whose physical state approximates, as closely as possible, that 
of the subject property. In ascertaining the “physical state” of the 
property, it is important to consider two sub-limbs: (a) how the subject 
property should be defined and delineated for the purposes of property 
tax;23 and having done so, (b) the extent to which the physical state of a 
property considered for comparative anchor valuation approximates 
that of the subject property. 
(1) The first sub-limb: Defining and delineating the property to be 
assessed 
7 As a general rule, properties are separately identified in the 
Valuation List24 and separately assessed.25 This general rule is not 
 
20 The annual value of a property is statutorily defined as the gross amount at which 
the taxable property can reasonably be expected to be let from year to year. It is 
determined by reference to a “hypothetical tenant” and what he would pay to rent 
it from year to year. See s 2(1) of the Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed); 
London County Council v The Churchwardens and Overseers of the Poor of the 
Parish of Erith in the County of Kent, and the Assessment Committee of the Dartford 
Union [1893] AC 562 at 588; R v Paddington Valuation Officer, ex parte Peachey 
Property Corp Ltd [1966] 1 QB 380 at 412. 
21 Williams (Valuation Officer) v Scottish & Newcastle Retail Ltd [2001] EWCA 
Civ 185 at [17]; Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 
at [32]. 
22 Burvill v Jones (Valuation Officer) [2013] UKUT 101 (LC) at [38]. 
23 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [5], where 
Lord Sumption JSC states the question thus: “Given that non-domestic rates are a 
tax on individual properties, what is the property in question?” See also the similar 
Singapore position, ie, that the rebus sic stantibus principle can be used to identify 
the assessable entity: Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 
at [32]. 
24 A “Valuation List” comprising the annual values of all taxable property in 
Singapore is compiled by the Chief Assessor annually. See s 10(1) of the Property 
Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed). 
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inflexible, however, and multiple separate properties may be assessed as 
one unit, thereby being jointly subjected to the application of the rebus 
sic stantibus principle. However, any such identification must not 
offend the rebus sic stantibus principle that the land should be valued 
“as it stands”.26 
8 There are two principles applicable to the identification of a 
property: (a) the geographical test; and (b) the functional test. The 
primary test is the geographical test, but the functional test may 
sometimes be relevant.27 
(a) The geographical test. The geographical test is based on 
visual or cartographic unity.28 Properties which are contiguous 
prima facie form one property for valuation purposes.29 
However, contiguity is not the only factor. As Lord Sumption 
held in the leading English case of Woolway (Valuation 
Officer) v Mazars LLP:30  
If adjoining houses in a terrace or vertically contiguous units 
in an office block do not intercommunicate and can be 
accessed only via other property … of which the common 
occupier is not in exclusive possession, this will be a strong 
indication that they are separate hereditaments. 
(b) The functional test. Where two spaces are 
geographically distinct, the functional test may nevertheless 
enable them to be treated as a single property. Property A (“A”) 
would be valued together with a non-contiguous property B 
(“B”) if A is functionally essential to the enjoyment of B as B 
stands or vice versa, but not if A and B are in themselves 
functionally independent and merely complement each other in 
some overarching purpose.31 Whether A is functionally 
essential to the enjoyment of B is to be objectively assessed.32 
 
25 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [1]; Aspinden 
Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [14] (where this position is 
implicitly stated). 
26 Norman v Department of Transport (1996) 72 P & CR 210. 
27 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [6] and [17]. 
28 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [12]. 
29 Norman v Department of Transport (1996) 72 P & CR 210. 
30 [2015] AC 1862 at [12]. It is noted that unlike English law, there is no concept of 
the hereditament as the unit of assessment in Singapore law. Rather, s 6(1) of the 
Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed) refers to “houses, buildings, lands and 
tenements”, collectively referred to as “property” in s 6(2). This has to be borne in 
mind when reading the English case law. 
31 Gilbert (Valuation Officer) v S Hickinbottom & Sons Ltd [1956] 2 QB 40 at 49–50; 
see also Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [14], 
approving this statement of principle. 
32 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [12]. 
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The test is commonly applied by asking whether the two 
sections could reasonably be let separately,33 though it is not the 
only test; a factual judgment on the part of the valuer and the 
exercise of a large measure of professional common sense is 
required.34 
(c) Application of principles in Singapore law. In Aspinden, 
the Singapore Court of Appeal considered whether various 
strata lots in a shopping mall could be amalgamated and 
assessed as a single assessable entity. The court held that the 
rebus sic stantibus principle applied to strata lots, such that, 
where several lots were combined and occupied as one, they 
would be regarded as a single “tenement” and assessed as such 
on a combined basis.35 In coming to its decision, the Court of 
Appeal also considered the Chief Assessor’s decisions in several 
older cases (“the Jalan Nuri cases”). The Jalan Nuri cases 
concerned several houses where a house and its garden each 
occupied a separate lot with no physical walls or dividing lines 
between them. The court held that the lots should have been 
assessed as an integral whole.36 
9 In HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Chief 
Assessor,37 the VRB had to consider whether a carpark adjacent to a 
shopping mall should be exigible to assessment on a combined basis. 
The VRB held that the properties should be separately assessed because: 
(a) the carpark was physically separate and distinct from the shopping 
mall; (b) there was no distinct association of any part of the carpark 
with any retail, warehouse or ancillary units of the shopping mall; 
(c) the function of a carpark was clearly distinct from that of a shopping 
mall; and (d) the carpark was capable of being separately let.38 The 
factors considered by the VRB are arguably a direct and substantive 
application of the geographical test (with the focus on physical 
separation) and functional test (with the emphasis on functional 
differences between the carpark and the shopping mall, as well as the 
capacity for separate letting of the carpark), with both tests leaning in 
favour of separate assessment on the facts of this case. 
 
33 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [12]. 
34 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [12]. 
35 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [18]. 
36 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [63] and [66]. 
37 [2017] SGVRB 1. 
38 HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor [2017] SGVRB 1 
at [36]. 
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(2) The second sub-limb: Comparing physical states of subject and 
comparable properties 
10 In selecting appropriate comparable properties, the rebus sic 
stantibus principle requires that regard be had to the physical state and 
other crucial physical aspects of the subject property. Thus, in Robinson 
Brothers (Brewers), Ltd v Assessment Committee for the No 7 or 
Houghton and Chester-le-Street Area of the County of Durham39 
(“Robinson Brothers”), Scott LJ observed that the properties must be 
rated on the basis of “all its actualities”, including all of its intrinsic 
advantages and disadvantages, and all of its imperfections and 
drawbacks which may deter or reduce competition for it.40 It follows 
that both the physical condition and material physical features of a 
property as it stands must be taken into account when identifying a 
comparable property. 
11 The Robinson Brothers position was cited with approval in Chief 
Assessor v Howe Yoon Chong.41 In that case, the property in question, 
owned by one Howe, had a long, finger-like projection leading to the 
road. The Chief Assessor increased the assessment of annual value to 
account for that projection. Howe objected to the additional 
assessment. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Chief 
Assessor on the grounds of the rebus sic stantibus principle; the 
projection was a part of the property as it in fact stood and served real 
purposes (eg, access for the property to the road) and should be 
considered in determining the annual value of the property.42 
12 Practically, for the purposes of assessments, it is often difficult 
to find a comparable property that is exactly identical in all particulars 
to the subject property. Thus, it is likely that a proxy comparable will 
have to be identified, and appropriate adjustments made to the annual 
value derived from the comparables to account for differences in 
physical condition between them,43 though, here, allowances may be 
made for de minimis structural alterations which do not change the 
mode or category of occupation and (crucially) would likely be taken 
into account by a hypothetical tenant bidding for the premises.44 Thus, 
 
39 [1937] 2 KB 445. 
40 Robinson Brothers (Brewers), Ltd v Assessment Committee for the No 7 or Houghton 
and Chester-le-Street Area of the County of Durham [1937] 2 KB 445 at 468. 
41 [1983–1984] SLR(R) 657. 
42 Chief Assessor v Howe Yoon Chong [1983–1984] SLR(R) 657 at [15]. 
43 Chief Assessor v Howe Yoon Chong [1983–1984] SLR(R) 657 at [25]; Wilson-
Smith v Attrill (Valuation Officer) [2011] UKUT 287 (LC) (concerning whether 
and to what extent adjustments should be made for an access ramp to the subject 
property). 
44 Wilson-Smith v Attrill (Valuation Officer) [2011] UKUT 287 (LC); Williams 
(Valuation Officer) v Scottish & Newcastle Retail Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 185 at [74]. 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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given the near impossibility of finding identical comparables, it stands 
to reason that any comparable, to be truly such, must share certain 
common material physical features with the subject property. 
13 These material physical features are not exhaustively or 
authoritatively defined for every situation that may arise. However, 
English authority has provided some guidance as to what factors might 
be considered. In Cheale Meats Ltd v Ray (Valuation Officer)45 (“Cheale 
Meats”), the following factors were identified in the context of an 
abattoir and characterised as a “series of filters” weeding out 
inappropriate comparable alternatives or indicating material sources of 
adjustment to the comparison-derived annual value of the subject 
property: (a) location (proximity to producers and markets, access and 
transport communications, observed by the English Lands Tribunal in 
Cheale Meats to be a “key criterion”); (b) size; (c) age, condition and 
layout;46 and (d) facilities. 
14 These factors were also applied in the Irish Lands Tribunal case 
of Kennedy Entertainments Ltd v The Commissioner of Valuation.47 In 
the local case of The Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief 
Assessor48 (“The Legends”), involving the rating of a town club located 
near the central business area, the VRB observed that the sale value of 
another club would serve as an appropriate comparable because of their 
similarity in locality, size and facilities,49 which is broadly similar to the 
conditions set out in Cheale Meats above. 
15 The weight to be given to each factor likely depends on the facts 
of each case. An increased emphasis on location is likely to be given in 
respect of industrial or commercial properties, though the particular 
locational features of the subject property to be considered will depend 
on the nature of the subject property as it stands. Thus, in the case of an 
abattoir, the locational features considered would include the quality of 
road communications (ie, distance and ease of access to highways) and 
proximity to the “main pig and cattle producing areas of Great 
Britain”.50 
 
See also Re Manning (Valuation Officer) [2014] UKUT 476 (LC); and Sheffield 
United Tours Ltd v Elliott (Valuation Officer) and Sheffield Metropolitan District 
Council [1983] RA 81. 
45 [2012] UKUT 61 (LC). 
46 It is important to note that in the UK, there is a statutory fiction that the subject 
hereditament is in a state of reasonable repair: see para 2(1) of Schedule 6 to the 
Local Government Finance Act 1988 (c 41). There is no equivalent statutory fiction 
in Singapore. 
47 [2002] VR/27/2000. 
48 [2015] SGVRB 1. 
49 The Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2015] SGVRB 1 at [25]. 
50 Cheale Meats Ltd v Ray (Valuation Officer) [2012] UKUT 61 (LC). 
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16 Local cases have shown that the locational features would 
markedly differ for country clubs. In The Legends, which, as has been 
noted, concerned the rating of a town club located in the town area, 
proximate to shopping amenities and well served by public transport 
links, it was noted that the use of a site at the north-eastern tip of 
Singapore, far removed from the town area, could not serve as a useful 
comparable because of the lack of proximity to shopping amenities and 
to public transport networks.51 
17 Accordingly, the approaches taken by the UK and Singapore 
courts to the first limb of the rebus sic stantibus rule appear to be 
broadly aligned with each other. The identification of comparables for 
rating comparisons would depend on three main factors: location, size 
and facilities, with the weighty features of each depending on the 
unique set of circumstances in each case, particularly the nature of the 
property as it stands. 
B. The second limb 
18 The second limb of the rebus sic stantibus rule relates to the use 
of the subject property; the subject property can only be valued 
according to its actual usage.52 Thus, the identification of comparable 
properties for the purpose of rating are constrained by the “actual 
usage” of the subject property. The “actual usage” of the subject 
property appears to be given a broad reading, and indicates the 
existence of a “penumbra” of acceptable alternative usages surrounding 
the actual use to which the subject property is put, as long as they are in 
the “same mode or category”. Under both Singapore and English law, 
the statement of principle is as laid out by the English Lands Tribunal in 
Fir Mill Ltd v Royton Urban District Council and Jones (Valuation 
Officer),53 that:54 
… the mode or category of occupation by the hypothetical tenant 
must be conceived as the same mode or category as that of the actual 
occupier. A dwelling-house must be assessed as a dwelling-house, a 
shop as a shop, but not as any particular kind of shop; a factory as a 
factory but not any particular kind of factory. [the “Fir Mill 
Principle”] 
 
51 The Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2015] SGVRB 1 at [35]. 
52 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [53]. 
53 (1960) 7 RRC 171. 
54 Fir Mill Ltd v Royton Urban District Council and Jones (Valuation Officer) (1960) 
7 RRC 171 at 185. This was adopted with approval in the Singapore case of 
Diethelm & Co Ltd v Chief Assessor (No 2) [1959–1986] SPTC 290. This principle 
was referred to by the English Court of Appeal in the subsequent case of Byrne v 
Parker [1980] RA 45 at 49–50. 
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However, beyond the Fir Mill Principle, what is considered to be the 
same mode or category of use as the actual use to which the subject 
property is put is a “matter of fact in each case”.55 
19 In the local cases of Bata Shoe Co Ltd v Chief Assessor56 and 
Diethelm & Co Ltd v Chief Assessor (No 2)57 (“Diethelm”), the VRB 
considered arguments that the subject property, both factories for shoes 
and furniture respectively, could only be valued with reference to 
comparable properties that were shoe and furniture factories 
respectively. Both propositions were rejected on the grounds of the 
second limb of the rebus sic stantibus principle; valuation evidence 
furnished by comparable properties “within the same general industrial 
class”58 could be used to establish an anchor annual value for the subject 
property. 
20 Where comparables lie outside the scope of the second limb of 
the rebus sic stantibus principle, they are only of use in determining the 
final annual value of the subject property if the valuation evidence 
derived therefrom is relevant to the circumstances of the case.59 This is a 
vague statement of principle, but it is arguable that it may apply, 
for example, where the subject properties both share similar defects 
(for example, an increased risk of flooding). The discount applied to 
one property with respect to these defects may well be considered 
relevant to determining the quantum of the discount to be applied to 
the other in respect of the same defect, even though both properties 
would not be considered strictly “comparable” within the definition of 
the second limb of the rebus sic stantibus principle. 
(1) Relevance of planning and zoning permissions 
21 Some controversy exists as to whether planning and zoning 
permissions may define the scope of the “penumbra” of acceptable 
alternative usages in applying the second limb of the rebus sic stantibus 
principle. 
22 The idea that alternative uses permitted by the planning 
legislation could be considered as within the “same mode or category” 
as the actual use of the subject property was considered in the English 
 
55 Sheffield United Tours Ltd v Elliott (Valuation Officer) and Sheffield Metropolitan 
District Council [1983] RA 81. 
56 [1971] 1 MLJ xli. 
57 [1959–1986] SPTC 290. 
58 Bata Shoe Co Ltd v Chief Assessor [1971] 1 MLJ xli. 
59 Williams (Valuation Officer) v Scottish & Newcastle Retail Ltd [2001] EWCA 
Civ 185 at [52]. 
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Lands Tribunal case of Midland Bank Ltd v Lanham (Valuation 
Officer),60 where it is stated: 
… that in valuing for rating purposes it is necessary to take the 
hereditament as it stands rebus sic stantibus; that the value as thus 
restricted must relate to the hereditament in its existing physical state; 
and that the use of the hereditament must be taken to be within the 
same mode or category as the existing use. So much, I think, is 
established by authority, … finally, all alternative uses to which the 
hereditament in its existing state could be put in the real world, and 
which would be in the minds of competing bidders in the market, are to 
be taken as being within the same mode or category, where the 
existence of such competition can be established by evidence. 
[emphasis added] [“the Midland Bank Principle”] 
The reference to “all alternative uses” which would be “in the minds of 
competing bidders in the market” would clearly allow all alternative 
uses permitted by planning permissions to be considered in applying 
the rebus sic stantibus principle. Thus, a shop would not necessarily 
need to be valued as a shop if planning permission allowed it to be used 
for light industry in its present existing state. The Midland Bank 
Principle therefore represented an expansion of the Fir Mill Principle. 
23 The Midland Bank Principle was rejected by a superior tribunal 
in Williams (Valuation Officer) v Scottish & Newcastle Retail Ltd61 
(“Scottish & Newcastle”), where Robert Walker LJ held that the Midland 
Bank Principle was “either self-contradictory, or at best reduces the 
second limb of the [rebus sic stantibus] rule to a pale reflection of the 
first limb”.62 The self-contradictory nature of the Midland Bank 
Principle lay in the fact that its reference to “all alternative uses … 
appears to contradict the immediately preceding reference to the use 
being limited to the same mode or category as the existing use”.63 The 
Midland Bank Principle also rendered the second limb of the rebus sic 
stantibus rule essentially meaningless, and established the first limb of 
the rebus sic stantibus as the primary (if not the sole) governing 
principle of assessment, by being so broad as to encompass nearly all 
possible comparable properties as acceptable alternative usages to the 
subject property. 
24 Despite its rejection in England, however, the Midland Bank 
Principle has survived in the Hong Kong case of Commissioner of 
 
60 [1978] RA 1. 
61 [2001] EWCA Civ 185. 
62 Williams (Valuation Officer) v Scottish & Newcastle Retail Ltd [2001] EWCA 
Civ 185 at [69]. 
63 Williams (Valuation Officer) v Scottish & Newcastle Retail Ltd [2001] EWCA 
Civ 185 at [42]. 
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Rating and Valuation v Lai Kit Lau Mutual Aid Committee64 (“Lai Kit 
Lau”), which was decided before Scottish & Newcastle. In Lai Kit Lau, 
Kempster JA held that, “where there is evidence of a demand for like 
premises to be put to some alternative use, such evidence may be taken 
into account”. This restatement of the Midland Bank Principle focuses 
on evidence of market demand for alternative uses rather than on what 
the property in fact is (the focus of the Fir Mill Principle.) 
25 While the Fir Mill Principle appears to be good law in 
Singapore, having been cited in Diethelm, the applicability of the 
Midland Bank Principle is uncertain. The Midland Bank Principle 
appears to have been rejected in Singapore Turf Club v Chief Assessor65 
(“Singapore Turf Club”), where in the assessment of a race course 
complex, the VRB rejected the relevance of zoning rules that permitted 
it to be alternatively used for “public open spaces”, holding instead that 
the complex was to be valued as a race course complex. More recently, 
in The Legends, the issue was whether a comparable country club could 
be used as a basis for valuing a town club, given that the zoning of the 
country club was “Recreation” while that of the town club was “Park 
and Garden”. The VRB held that:66 
… the suggestion that the subject property should be assessed in 
accordance with its zoning as ‘Park and Garden’ runs contrary to the 
principles of rebus sic stantibus in ascertaining the annual value. In 
estimating the ECV, the property must be assessed based on its current 
approved usage and as it stands. In this case, the subject property must 
be assessed as a clubhouse. The subject property is not used only as park 
or garden space. The rebus sic stantibus principle requires the subject 
property to be assessed in its physical condition and existing approved 
use as a recreational clubhouse, regardless of its zoning. [emphasis 
added] 
While the phrase “regardless of its zoning” appears to imply that 
planning permissions are completely irrelevant (thereby displacing the 
Midland Bank Principle), the earlier reference to the subject property 
not being used only as park or garden space appears to imply otherwise, 
leading to some ambiguity. If the first statement (ie, that planning 
permissions are irrelevant) holds true, then there is no need to refer to 
the zoning use of the subject property as park or garden space at all. 
 
64 [1986] HKLR 93. 
65 [1983] 2 MLJ cxxxiii. 
66 The Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2015] SGVRB 1 at [39]. 
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III. The Statutory Formula 
A. Methods of assessment 
26 It will be recalled that the “annual value” of taxable property is 
statutorily defined as the gross amount at which the taxable property 
can reasonably be expected to be let from year to year.67 In determining 
this value, several methods of assessment may be applied. Leung and 
See list four principal methods of assessment:68 (a) the “Rental 
Comparison Method”;69 (b) the “Contractor’s Test”;70 (c) the “Profits 
Method”;71 and (d) the “Statutory Formulae”.72 The first three methods 
of assessment attempt to derive an annual value in accordance with the 
statutory hypothesis in the PTA (ie, the gross amount at which the 
taxable property can reasonably be expected to be let from year to 
year,73 even though that property might not have been let out at all).74 
On the other hand, the Statutory Formula is different in that it is not a 
valuation method but only a formula, which deems the annual value to 
be 5% of the estimated value of the property.75 
B. The Statutory Formula 
27 Section 2(3) of the PTA provides as follows: 
 
67 Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed) s 2(1). 
68 Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015) at p 257. 
69 Where the annual value of a property is estimated using the rents of comparable 
properties as a guide. See Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in 
Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2015) at p 260. 
70 Where an interest rate is applied to the capital value of a property to determine the 
annual value of a property. See Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in 
Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2015) at p 289. 
71 Where the annual value of a property is determined by reference to the anticipated 
profits that may be generated by the business which occupies the property. See 
Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015) at p 306. 
72 There are several kinds of statutory formulae which apply to specific kinds of 
situations. See Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore 
(LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2015) at pp 314–323. A “Statutory Formula” of general 
application also exists in s 2(3) of the Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed) and 
uses the capital value of a property to derive its annual value. All references in this 
article are to the general “Statutory Formula”. See Property Tax in Singapore 
at p 323. 
73 Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed) s 2(1). 
74 Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015) at p 257. 
75 Chief Assessor v National Shipbreakers Pte Ltd [1979–1980] SLR(R) 623  
at [27]–[33]. 
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(3) In assessing the annual value of any property, the annual 
value of the property shall, at the option of the Chief Assessor, be 
deemed to be the annual value as defined in this Act or the sum which 
is equivalent to the annual interest at 5% — 
(a) on the estimated value of the property, including 
buildings, if any, thereon; or 
(b) on the estimated value of the land as if it were 
vacant land with no buildings erected, or being erected, 
thereon. 
28 The Statutory Formula is to be applied, at the discretion of the 
Chief Assessor, where any of the other methods of assessment are not 
appropriate.76 The threshold for questioning the discretion of the Chief 
Assessor appears to be an extremely high one. Even if it may be possible 
or even practical to apply any of the other methods of assessment, the 
Chief Assessor may yet be able to apply the Statutory Formula. In City 
Developments Ltd v Chief Assessor77 (“City Developments”), the 
Singapore Court of Appeal held that “there were effectively only two 
ways in which CDL could challenge the Chief Assessor’s exercise of 
discretion under s 2(3) of the Act, viz, that the Chief Assessor had either 
acted illegally, or he had acted irrationally”.78 
29 The Statutory Formula does not specify how the estimated 
value of the property is to be derived. While it provides that the annual 
value is 5% of the estimated value, the Statutory Formula provides no 
guidance on how to determine the estimated value in the first place. In 
Tai Lai Holdings Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor79 (“Tai Lai”), the VRB held 
that the estimated value “must be the market value of the property. In 
arriving at an estimate of the market value of the subject properties, the 
Chief Assessor is entitled to take into account what a willing buyer is 
prepared to pay for the subject properties and what a willing seller is 
prepared to accept for parting with the subject properties”.80 
IV. The Statutory Formula and the rebus sic stantibus principle 
A. Displacement of the rebus sic stantibus principle 
30 This section of the article seeks to show that the local 
jurisprudence has formulated a proposition that the rebus sic stantibus 
 
76 Chief Assessor v National Shipbreakers Pte Ltd [1979–1980] SLR(R) 623 at [32]. 
77 [2008] 4 SLR(R) 150. 
78 City Developments Ltd v Chief Assessor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 150 at [9]. 
79 (1991) 1 MSTC 5076. 
80 Tai Lai Holdings Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor (1991) 1 MSTC 5076 at 5077. 
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principle is to be displaced where the Chief Assessor has invoked the 
Statutory Formula (s 2(3) of the PTA in general and not specifically 
s 2(3)(b)). Several cases and leading texts refer to this proposition in this 
broad sense. However, it is noted that it would appear that in practice, 
the learned commentators and Boards do appreciate that the 
proposition does not apply in its broad sense. They have implicitly 
drawn a distinction between the cases where s 2(3)(a) and s 2(3)(b) are 
invoked. The proposition is not applied in its general (broad) form, but 
rather, correctly applied in that the rebus sic stantibus principle is only 
disapplied where s 2(3)(b) is invoked, and still applied where s 2(3)(a) is 
invoked. 
31 However, it is worth exploring the theoretical foundations of 
this proposition and highlighting that the proper scope of the 
proposition should be accurately stated. This may help to prevent 
confusion which may arise if the proposition as currently stated in the 
cases and texts is read out of context. 
(1) The VRB cases 
32 As early as 1992, in Poh Hee Construction Pte Ltd v Chief 
Assessor81 (“Poh Hee Construction”), the VRB held that “it was not 
possible for [them] to say that the Chief Assessor must use the rule 
rebus sic stantibus” where s 2(3) of the PTA applied.82 In The Legends, 
the VRB held that “the rebus sic stantibus principle states that the 
assessable entity should be valued according to its physical nature and 
condition as well as its usage”, thus finding the principle to have no 
application where s 2(3) of the PTA applied.83 In the recent Swiss Club 
case, the VRB held, citing Aspinden, Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore84 and 
Property Tax in Singapore,85 that “where there is a statutory formula for 
the assessment of annual value like in section 2(3) of the Act, the 
common law principle of rebus sic stantibus does not apply”.86 
(2) The Court of Appeal cases 
33 In Aspinden, the Singapore Court of Appeal drew a distinction 
between deeming provisions in the PTA that provide for a statutory 
formula for the assessment of annual value (ss 2(3) and 2(5) of the PTA) 
 
81 (1992) 1 MSTC 5100. 
82 Poh Hee Construction Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor (1992) 1 MSTC 5100 at 5102. 
83 The Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2015] SGVRB 1 at [19]. 
84 Vol 16 (“Revenue and Taxation – Other Taxes”) (LexisNexis, 2015). 
85 Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015). 
86 HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax 
[2018] SGVRB 2 at [30]–[31]. 
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and those that do not (s 2(7) of the PTA), holding that common law 
principles of valuation such as the rebus sic stantibus principle would 
continue to apply in cases of the latter (but, it may be implied, not the 
former).87 Several years later, Aspinden was followed by yet another 
Court of Appeal decision, Glengary, where the court held that “[i]t is 
clear from a plain reading of s 2(3)(b) of the Act that the usual 
principles of reality and rebus sic stantibus must be circumscribed, or 
more accurately, give way to the statutory fiction of ‘vacant land’”.88 
(3) The leading texts 
34 With the benefit of the court’s reasoning in these two Court of 
Appeal decisions, the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore 
have commented that “[t]he rebus sic stantibus principle in so far as it 
restricts the assessment to the actual use of the property, does not apply 
in the application of the Chief Assessor’s statutory formula option. That 
common law principle is displaced by the statutory provisions”.89 
Similarly, the learned authors of the seminal text, Property Tax in 
Singapore, have expressed the view that “[i]n the application of the 
option in s 2(3), the rebus sic stantibus principle however does not apply 
in arriving at the ‘estimated value’ of the property. The words ‘estimated 
value’ in s 2(3) which point to the market value that the property will 
fetch in the open market, is not limited to the value of the property 
based on its existing physical condition and use”.90 
B. Analysing the positions taken in the various authorities 
35 However, careful consideration of the present authorities 
reveals that the various positions taken are perhaps not as uniform as 
might seem at first glance. 
(1) Absolute language: The rebus sic stantibus principle has no 
application where s 2(3) of the PTA is applied 
36 In the three VRB cases of Poh Hee Construction, The Legends 
and Swiss Club, and the seminal text, Property Tax in Singapore, the 
language used is rather absolute, with each authority stating that the 
 
87 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [36]. 
88 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [20]. 
89 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 16 (“Revenue and Taxation – Other Taxes”) 
(LexisNexis, 2018 Reissue) at para 200.584. 
90 Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015) at p 137. 
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rebus sic stantibus principle has no application where s 2(3) of the PTA 
applied.91 
(2) Qualified language: The rebus sic stantibus principle is not 
applicable in so far as it restricts the assessment to the actual use 
of the property 
(a) Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore: Citing Tai Lai 
37 The learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore qualify 
their statement regarding the non-applicability of the rebus sic stantibus 
principle by saying that this applies “in so far as it restricts the 
assessment to the actual use of the property”.92 This statement 
references the second limb of the rebus sic stantibus principle, which, it 
will be recalled, relates to the actual use of the subject property, and is 
distinct from the first limb, which relates to the physical state of the 
property. The authority which the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of 
Singapore cite for this is Tai Lai.93 It is noted that the term “rebus sic 
stantibus” is never expressly used in Tai Lai, but the principle can be 
somewhat discerned from the following passage by the VRB in the 
case:94 
In arriving at an estimate of the market value of the subject properties, 
the Chief Assessor is entitled to take into account what a willing buyer 
is prepared to pay for the subject properties and what a willing seller is 
prepared to accept for parting with the subject properties and that 
both the buyer and the seller must of course take into consideration 
the fact that these are eight contiguous plots with the potential of 
being used for a large development. 
38 While one can see how the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws 
of Singapore drew their conclusion from Tai Lai, with respect, the 
proposition gleaned from the case may perhaps be more precisely 
stated. Firstly, Tai Lai was a case where the equivalent of s 2(3)(b) was 
invoked by the Chief Assessor. Thus, it may be a little tricky to extend 
the principle in Tai Lai to include cases involving s 2(3)(a) as well. 
Secondly, it does not directly follow that just because the estimated 
 
91 Poh Hee Construction Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor (1992) 1 MSTC 5100 at 5102; The 
Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2015] SGVRB 1 at [19]; HSBC 
Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax [2018] 
SGVRB 2 at [30]. 
92 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 16 (“Revenue and Taxation – Other Taxes”) 
(LexisNexis, 2018 Reissue) at para 200.584. 
93 Tai Lai Holdings Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor (1991) 1 MSTC 5076. See Halsbury’s Laws 
of Singapore vol 16 (“Revenue and Taxation – Other Taxes”) (LexisNexis, 2018 
Reissue) at para 200.584, fn 13. 
94 Tai Lai Holdings Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor (1991) 1 MSTC 5076 at 5081. 
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market value is determined by what a willing buyer is prepared to pay 
and what a willing seller is willing to accept, one is not allowed to 
consider the actual use of the property. At the very least, there is no 
express prohibition on this point, leaving the door open for the 
possibility, if unlikely, that we might consider the “willing seller” to be 
in the same trade of the “willing buyer”, and intending to continue to 
put the land to the same use after purchase. Finally, while the VRB in 
Tai Lai did recognise that the estimated market value was to take into 
consideration the fact that the plots could potentially be combined, it 
also does not directly follow that all the factors relating to the physical 
state of the property (ie, all factors relating to the first limb and not to 
the second) may be taken into account when the Statutory Formula is 
invoked by the Chief Assessor. 
(b) Other cases 
39 Apart from Tai Lai, three other cases may arguably be said to 
support the proposition of the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of 
Singapore. The first two were cited in Tai Lai itself, where the VRB 
referenced Nagappa Chettiar v Collector of Land Revenue95 (“Nagappa 
Chettiar”) for the proposition that “‘[m]arket value’ has been defined as 
the price that an owner willing and not obliged to sell might reasonably 
expect to obtain from a willing purchaser with whom he was bargaining 
for the sale and purchase of land”; including the latter case’s citation of 
Nanyang Manufacturing Co v Collector of Land Revenue, Johore96 
(“Nanyang Manufacturing”) stating that “the safest guide to determine 
fair market value is the evidence of sales of the same land or similar land 
in the neighbourhood”.97 
40 Also, in the decision of the Federal Court of Malaysia in 
Collector of Land Revenue, Kuantan v Noor Chahaya bte Abdul Majid98 
(“Noor Chahaya”), the court held that “[w]hile the learned judge rightly 
directed himself that potentiality is a factor to be taken into account in 
assessing compensation he had formed the erroneous view that market 
value and potential value are two separate items to be determined 
separately and then to be added to one another”, and that “‘[m]arket 
value” must indeed include potential value”.99 
 
95 [1971] 1 MLJ 59 at 60. 
96 [1954] 1 MLJ 69. 
97 Tai Lai Holdings Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor (1991) 1 MSTC 5076 at 5081. 
98 [1979] 1 MLJ 180. 
99 Collector of Land Revenue, Kuantan v Noor Chahaya bte Abdul Majid [1979] 
1 MLJ 180. 
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(c) Analysis of the cases 
41 At first glance, it would seem that the only case which may 
potentially have any force as binding precedent is Nanyang 
Manufacturing, being a case of the Malaysian High Court decided 
before Singapore’s independence. Tai Lai is a decision of the VRB, 
Nagappa Chettiar is a decision of the Malaysian High Court decided 
post-Independence, Noor Chahaya is a decision of the Federal Court of 
Malaysia decided post-Independence, and Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore 
is not binding case authority. 
42 Further, it is noted that with the exception of Tai Lai, none of 
the abovementioned cases actually related to s 2(3) of the PTA or 
provisions in pari materia. Given that the issue in question is precisely 
whether the rebus sic stantibus principle is applicable where s 2(3) of the 
PTA is also applied, it is difficult to draw any clear statement of 
principle from the cases. References to “market value”, “similar land” 
and “potential value” in themselves do not clearly establish the 
proposition that the actual use of the property is irrelevant when 
estimating market value under s 2(3) of the PTA. 
43 The fact that clear principles are difficult to extract from the Tai 
Lai decision, and its status as a VRB decision, makes it difficult to rely 
on it as persuasive authority, especially in light of the two major Court 
of Appeal decisions of Glengary100 and Aspinden,101 decided after Tai 
Lai, which do not appear to go as far as to support the broad 
proposition in Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore that the rebus sic stantibus 
principle is not applicable when assessing a property under s 2(3) of the 
PTA. Tai Lai itself was never mentioned by the Court of Appeal in 
either Glengary or Aspinden. 
44 It is noted that, in the Swiss Club case, the respondent cited Tai 
Lai for the proposition that the rebus sic stantibus principle is not 
applicable when assessing a property under s 2(3) of the PTA.102 The 
VRB accepted the respondent’s argument in that case.103 
45 In summary, it is submitted that the proposition allegedly 
established in Tai Lai, as interpreted by the learned authors of 
Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore, that where s 2(3) of the PTA applies, the 
rebus sic stantibus principle is to be displaced insofar as it restricts the 
 
100 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [20]. 
101 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [36]. 
102 HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax 
[2018] SGVRB 2 at [16]. 
103 HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax 
[2018] SGVRB 2 at [30]. 
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assessment to the actual use of the property, is not a principle binding 
on the Singapore courts. Further, given the lack of detailed reasoning on 
the point, its persuasive value is also somewhat limited. Even if the 
proposition is accepted, the context in which it arose in Tai Lai, relating 
to the s 2(3)(b) of the PTA context, would mean that in the absence of 
any additional persuasive argument, it should be confined to s 2(3)(b) 
cases and not extended to s 2(3) cases in general. In this respect, the 
purported extension of the proposition to s 2(3) cases in general, and 
application in the context of a s 2(3)(a) case (as in the Swiss Club case) 
is questionable. This is particularly the case because the VRB in the 
Swiss Club case did not provide any specific arguments on why the 
proposition should be so extended to s 2(3)(a) cases. 
(3) Highly specific language: The rebus sic stantibus principle is not 
applicable in so far as it runs contrary to the statutory fiction of 
vacant land in s 2(3)(b) 
46 The Court of Appeal in Glengary chose its words very carefully, 
not only specifying that the overarching consideration was the need to 
give way to the statutory fiction of vacant land, but also mentioning 
s 2(3)(b) specifically.104 In light of the Court of Appeal’s authority, the 
fact that this decision deals precisely with the issue of the interaction 
between the rebus sic stantibus principle and s 2(3)(b) of the PTA, and 
the carefully reasoned judgment of the court, it is submitted that one 
must look to this case for a complete understanding of this area of law. 
The Glengary decision will be covered in detail in the following section 
of this article, where the limits of the rebus sic stantibus principle are 
discussed. 
(4) Comments made obiter 
47 While the Aspinden case was cited by the VRB in the Swiss Club 
case for the proposition that rebus sic stantibus does not apply “where 
there is a statutory formula for the assessment of annual value like in 
section 2(3) of the Act”,105 it is doubtful whether the Aspinden case does 
indeed take us that far. The first difficulty arises from the fact that the 
proposition adopted by the VRB in the Swiss Club case was actually 
obiter dicta in Aspinden, since the issue in question that the Court of 
Appeal was deciding in Aspinden related to s 2(7) of the PTA and had 
nothing to do with s 2(3). This brings us to the second difficulty, which 
is that any proposition on s 2(3) that may be drawn from Aspinden is 
 
104 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [20]. 
105 HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax 
[2018] SGVRB 2 at [30]–[31]. 
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necessarily one which arises by implication. In that case, the court held 
as follows:106 
… ss 2(3) and 2(5) of the PTA provide a statutory formula for the 
assessment of annual value. This is to be contrasted with s 2(7) which 
does not specify a similar formula. It can therefore be inferred that 
common law principles of valuation, such as the rebus sic stantibus 
principle, remain relevant in an assessment pursuant to s 2(7). 
The court thus did not expressly state that the rebus sic stantibus 
principle would be displaced where ss 2(3) and 2(5) of the PTA were 
applied; and even if it did, such a pronouncement would not only be 
obiter, but likely to be out of context and a generalisation as well. 
48 If the statements of the Court of Appeal in Aspinden are indeed 
obiter on this point, then the only binding authority in this area would 
appear to be the case of Glengary, and it is to that case we now turn, to 
establish the limits of the rebus sic stantibus principle. 
C. What are the limits of the rebus sic stantibus principle? 
(1) The inapplicability of the rebus sic stantibus principle in 
Glengary is confined to cases where it runs contrary to a 
statutory fiction 
49 In Glengary, the Court of Appeal held that, from a plain reading 
of s 2(3)(b) of the PTA, the usual principles of reality and rebus sic 
stantibus must be circumscribed, or more accurately, give way to the 
statutory fiction of “vacant land”.107 Immediately, the clarification and 
precise wording of the Court of Appeal suggests that it did not mean 
that the rebus sic stantibus principle was to be completely displaced 
where s 2(3)(b) of the PTA applied. Rather, the court specifically stated 
that the rebus sic stantibus principle cannot be applied in so far as it 
must give way to the statutory fiction of vacant land. 
(a) The concept of a statutory fiction 
50 In Glengary, the Singapore High Court noted that to give effect 
to a statutory fiction is to treat something as if it were really something 
else, or as if it had qualities which it did not have.108 Full effect is to be 
 
106 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [36]. 
107 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [20]. 
108 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [31]. 
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given to the statutory fiction109 and its ambit must be determined from 
an analysis of its purpose.110 As Goh Yihan explains:111 
[T]he statutory fiction is only to be carried to its logical conclusion 
within the framework of the purpose for which it was created. Such 
purpose may in tum be inferred from the inevitability of the 
consequences flowing from the statutory fiction. If the consequences 
were inevitable, then it may be presumed that Parliament intended 
them and will be within the purpose of the statutory fiction. 
51 The Court of Appeal went on to affirm the principles applied by 
the High Court judge, but differed in their interpretation of the 
objective behind s 2(3)(b) of the PTA, holding that the pre-sales were 
not to be included in the assessment of the estimated value of the 
deemed vacant land.112 
(b) Circumscribing the rebus sic stantibus principle 
52 The reasoning for the circumscription of the rebus sic stantibus 
principle in such a context was elaborated upon by the court, which 
stated that:113 
Whereas measuring the value of a plot of land by reference to its 
hypothetical rental value measures the actual use and occupation of 
the land …, measuring the value of that land by reference to its capital 
value measures the potential use and occupation of the land. The 
hypothetical rent is limited by the buildings and particular uses to 
which the land has been put. On the other hand, an assessment based 
on capital value permits the valuer to take into account wider 
considerations, including the full potential development value of the 
land as a vacant piece of land. [emphasis in original] 
53 It is clear that the rationale for circumscribing the rebus sic 
stantibus principle in Glengary was that the application of the principle 
would run counter to the legal fiction that the property in question was 
deemed to be vacant land. It is submitted that the exclusion of the rebus 
sic stantibus principle in Glengary is thus limited to the legal rule that 
the rebus sic stantibus principle must not be applied if it runs counter to 
a legal fiction. 
 
109 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [32]. 
110 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [35]. 
111 Goh Yihan, “Chapter 12: Statutory Interpretation” in The Legal System of 
Singapore: Institutions, Principles and Practices (Gary Chan Kok Yew & Jack Lee 
Tsen-Ta eds) (LexisNexis, 2015) at para 12.67. 
112 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [22]–[23]. 
113 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [21]. 
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54 There are potentially two legal fictions in s 2(3)(b) of the PTA. 
The first is, of course, that the property in question is deemed to be 
vacant land. The second is that the annual value of the property in 
question is deemed to be 5% of the estimated value of the land. The 
second legal fiction is the provision which deems the annual value of 
the property, and thus it is the first legal fiction that must be carefully 
considered. 
(c) Vacant land 
55 The key question here is what the statutory fiction of “vacant 
land” actually means. Guidance can be derived from Glengary itself, 
where the court held that “the statutory fiction of ‘vacant land’ permits 
the assessment of land value by reference to its capital value”, and that 
“an assessment based on capital value permits the valuer to take into 
account wider considerations, including the full potential development 
value of the land as a vacant piece of land”.114 In other words, the 
statutory fiction of “vacant land” appears to require that the current use 
of the land be ignored for the purposes of valuation. 
(d) Is the statutory fiction of vacant land the same as the Midland 
Bank Principle? 
56 As discussed above, the Fir Mill Principle states that the mode 
or category of occupation by the hypothetical tenant must be conceived 
as the same mode or category as that of the actual occupier.115 The 
Midland Bank Principle in turn represents an expansion of the Fir Mill 
Principle, such that alternative uses permitted by the planning 
legislation could be considered as within the “same mode or category” 
as the actual use of the subject property.116 
57 As noted in Scottish & Newcastle, the Midland Bank Principle 
appears to reduce the second limb of the rebus sic stantibus principle to 
a pale reflection of the first limb,117 in that it effectively negates the effect 
of the second limb. It may be argued that if the Midland Bank Principle 
requires a valuation to take into consideration all alternative uses 
permitted by the planning legislation, then that may be substantively no 
different from the statutory fiction of “vacant land”, which requires that 
the current use of the land be ignored for the purposes of valuation. 
 
114 Chief Assessor v Glengary Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 339 at [21]. 
115 Fir Mill Ltd v Royton Urban District Council and Jones (Valuation Officer) (1960) 
7 RRC 171 at 185. 
116 Midland Bank Ltd v Lanham (Valuation Officer) [1978] RA 1. 
117 Williams (Valuation Officer) v Scottish & Newcastle Retail Ltd [2001] EWCA 
Civ 185 at [69]. 
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58 This might also shed some light on the apparent rejection of the 
Midland Bank Principle in Singapore Turf Club,118 which involved the 
application of the contractor’s test rather than the Statutory Formula. 
This case also hints that the Fir Mill Principle rather than the Midland 
Bank Principle will be applied in Singapore. It is only where s 2(3)(b) 
comes into play that the substantively equivalent statutory fiction of 
“vacant land” becomes relevant. 
(2) The application of deeming provisions in the PTA does not 
override the common law principle of rebus sic stantibus as a 
matter of course 
59 The proposition that the rebus sic stantibus principle should 
only be displaced when it runs counter to a legal fiction can be seen in 
Aspinden, where the court held that:119 
34 Section 2(7) of the PTA did not displace any principle of 
assessment established under the common law. Section 2(7)(b) merely 
provided that the annual value of a strata lot was to be assessed as if it 
was a freehold estate in land. Consequently, the rebus sic stantibus 
principle should still apply in assessing the annual value of the subject 
properties. … 
35 … the word ‘deemed’ was not intended to override existing 
principles of assessment. Instead, it merely served to clarify the tax 
position of strata lot owners under the strata regime. … 
60 In other words, where it is possible to apply both the relevant 
legal fiction and the rebus sic stantibus principle without conflict, the 
rebus sic stantibus principle should not be circumscribed. 
(3) The first limb of the rebus sic stantibus principle can still apply 
where section 2(3) applies 
61 As noted above, the first limb of rebus sic stantibus requires 
“matters affecting the physical state or physical enjoyment” of the 
property to be considered at the valuation date.120 This raises issues of 
(a) how should the subject property be defined and delineated for the 
purposes of property tax;121 and having done so, (b) to what extent 
should the physical state of a property considered for comparative 
anchor valuation approximate that of the subject property? The first 
issue does not seem to conflict with any statutory fiction. As for the 
 
118 Singapore Turf Club v Chief Assessor [1983] 2 MLJ cxxxiii. 
119 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [34]–[35]. 
120 Burvill v Jones (Valuation Officer) [2013] UKUT 101 (LC). 
121 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862 at [5]; Aspinden 
Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [32]. 
  
 Singapore Property Tax Law as it Stands  
 
second, there is a need to consider the relevant factors. In Cheale 
Meats,122 the factors (a) location; (b) size; (c) age, condition and layout; 
and (d) facilities, were listed as potentially relevant factors. 
62 It is submitted that these factors have to be interpreted as being 
factors that relate to the land itself and not the use of the land, if the first 
limb of the rebus sic stantibus principle is not to be rendered otiose. In 
that case, there too is no conflict between the first limb of the rebus sic 
stantibus principle and any statutory fiction. Consequently, the first 
limb of the rebus sic stantibus principle should still be applicable even if 
s 2(3) is invoked by the Chief Assessor. 
(4) The rebus sic stantibus principle is still applicable where s 2(3)(a) 
of the PTA applies 
63 As submitted above, the rebus sic stantibus principle should 
only be circumscribed where it conflicts with a relevant legal fiction in 
the PTA. It is further submitted that this position receives much greater 
support from the existing case law than a position arguing for a blanket 
inapplicability of the rebus sic stantibus principle whenever s 2(3) of the 
PTA applies. 
64 In The Legends, the VRB accepted that s 2(3)(a) of the PTA 
should be applied to determine the annual value of the property. Yet, 
the VRB made no mention of any circumscription of the rebus sic 
stantibus principle in such an assessment. Rather, it expressly held that 
since the subject property was being used as a clubhouse despite its 
zoning as a “Park and Garden”, it was necessary to assess it based on its 
current approved usage and as it stands. Further, it noted that the 
“rebus sic stantibus principle requires the subject property to be assessed 
in its physical condition and existing approved use as a recreational 
clubhouse, regardless of its zoning”.123 
65 It would thus appear that despite s 2(3)(a) of the PTA being 
applied in The Legends, both limbs of the rebus sic stantibus principle 
were not only readily applied, but affirmed by the VRB in that case. It is 
submitted that this is explicable on the grounds that in The Legends, 
there was no question of the rebus sic stantibus principle conflicting 
with any statutory fiction. The legal fiction in s 2(3)(a) operates to deem 
the annual value of the property as 5% of the estimated value of the 
property, including any buildings thereon. It is noted that unlike 
s 2(3)(b), there is no additional statutory fiction that the land be “vacant 
land”. In fact, such a proposition would be at odds with the express 
 
122 Cheale Meats Ltd v Ray (Valuation Officer) [2012] UKUT 61 (LC). 
123 The Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2015] SGVRB 1 at [39]. 
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words of s 2(3)(a) that the property includes any buildings thereon. 
Both limbs of the rebus sic stantibus principle appear not to conflict 
with s 2(3)(a) and thus, should not be displaced in this context. 
66 Further authority for the proposition that the rebus sic stantibus 
principle is not automatically excluded when s 2(3) of the PTA is 
applied can be found in Wave House Singapore Pte Ltd v Chief 
Assessor124 (“Wave House”) where the VRB accepted that the Statutory 
Formula (s 2(3)(a)) could be used as a check method to the rental 
comparison method.125 In this context, the rebus sic stantibus principle 
was accepted and applied. It was held that the assessment of the subject 
property should take into account the property as it stood and as it was 
used at the time of the assessment.126 
D. Summary of the legal position and its importance 
67 It would thus appear from the cases that the applicability and 
application of the rebus sic stantibus principle hinges on whether the 
principle conflicts with a statutory fiction under s 2(3)(b) of the PTA. 
There might be such a conflict because the second limb of the rebus sic 
stantibus principle considers the actual use of land, while s 2(3)(b) 
considers the potential use of the land. Where there is such a conflict, 
the principle is to be displaced insofar as necessary to avoid the conflict. 
Since the only statutory fiction that may be of relevance in the s 2(3) 
context is that of “vacant land”, it would appear that the rebus sic 
stantibus principle will apply even where s 2(3)(a) is invoked by the 
Chief Assessor. In addition, since the first limb of the rebus sic stantibus 
principle appears to be in harmony with the statutory fiction of “vacant 
land”, it would appear that it is only where s 2(3)(b) is invoked by the 
Chief Assessor that the second (and only the second) limb of the rebus 
sic stantibus principle should be displaced. 
68 It is important to have a clear understanding of the relevant 
legal principles at play because ss 2(3)(a) and 2(3)(b) of the PTA 
operate in very different ways. The estimated capital value of a property 
can generally be broken down into two components: (a) “Land Value”; 
and (b) “Building Value”. It stands to reason that the value of the 
property as vacant land and as developed land, with buildings on it, may 
be different; although the value of the latter may not always exceed that 
of the former. 
 
124 [2016] SGVRB 1. 
125 Wave House Singapore Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2016] SGVRB 1 at [59] and [67]. 
126 Wave House Singapore Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2016] SGVRB 1 at [55]. 
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69 When s 2(3)(b) of the PTA is invoked by the Chief Assessor, the 
rebus sic stantibus principle will not apply in the assessment of the 
estimated value of the property to the extent that there is a conflict with 
the principle. However, the estimated value of the property will include 
only the Land Value component, since the statutory fiction is that the 
land is vacant land. On the other hand, when s 2(3)(a) of the PTA is 
invoked by the Chief Assessor, the rebus sic stantibus principle will 
apply in the assessment of the estimated value of the property. But the 
estimated value of the property will include both the Land Value and 
the Building Value, since s 2(3)(a) provides that the land be considered 
with any buildings on it. While there is a very high threshold of 
questioning the exercise of discretion of the Chief Assessor as to 
whether to invoke s 2(3), and if so, whether to invoke s 2(3)(a) or 
s 2(3)(b),127 it is submitted that the Chief Assessor is bound by the 
consequences of his decision according to the abovementioned points. 
In other words, the Chief Assessor has a broad discretion as to whether 
to invoke s 2(3)(a) or s 2(3)(b), but having made his choice, 
consequences will flow as a matter of law: invoking s 2(3)(a) allows both 
Land Value and Building Value to be taken into consideration 
(“Case 1”), while invoking s 2(3)(b) only allows the Land Value 
component to be taken into consideration (“Case 2”). 
70 It is worth noting that the “Land Value” in Case 1 and that in 
Case 2 may well be different because, as this article has sought to show, 
the “Land Value” is computed subject to the rebus sic stantibus principle 
in Case 1 but not in Case 2. By way of example, a property may 
currently be used as a recreational club, with a large clubhouse, but is 
actually zoned as residential property. If the Chief Assessor invokes 
s 2(3)(a), the Building Value of the clubhouse would be included, but 
the Land Value would be based on its current club use (in accordance 
with the rebus sic stantibus principle). On the other hand, if the Chief 
Assessor invokes s 2(3)(b), the Building Value of the clubhouse would 
be excluded, but the Land Value would be based on its potential use as 
residential property and much higher (the rebus sic stantibus principle 
being displaced because it runs contrary to the statutory fiction). 
E. Practical application of the proposition 
71 It would appear that while the proposition has been rather 
broadly stated, in practice, the courts have wisely “read-down” the 
proposition such that the rebus sic stantibus principle is only disapplied 
where there is a conflict between it and the statutory fiction (ie, in 
s 2(3)(b) cases only). 
 
127 City Developments Ltd v Chief Assessor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 150 at [9]. 
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72 While references to the rebus sic stantibus principle being 
disapplied in all cases involving the application of s 2(3) were made in 
Tai Lai128 and City Developments,129 both cases in fact involved the 
application of s 2(3)(b), which made application of the proposition apt, 
even if it could have been more precisely stated. As for cases involving 
the application of s 2(3)(a), like The Legends,130 Wave House131 and 
Singapore Turf Club,132 it would appear that despite the proposition 
arguably precluding the application of the rebus sic stantibus principle 
in such cases, the principle has in fact been consistently applied. 
73 The only curious case so far where the rebus sic stantibus 
principle was arguably not applied where s 2(3)(a) was invoked is the 
Swiss Club case.133 Although s 2(3)(a) of the PTA was invoked by the 
Chief Assessor and both the Land Value and Building Value were taken 
into consideration in the assessment, the VRB held that the rebus sic 
stantibus principle was inapplicable, rejecting the appellant’s contention 
that regard should be had to the fact that the property was zoned for 
residential use.134 While it was open to the Chief Assessor to assess the 
property under s 2(3)(a) or s 2(3)(b) of the PTA, given that it had 
chosen s 2(3)(a), the rebus sic stantibus principle should have been 
applicable and the Land Value should have been adjusted to reflect the 
fact that the property was zoned for residential use. The alternative 
would have been an assessment under s 2(3)(b), under which the rebus 
sic stantibus principle would not have been applicable, but accordingly, 
only the Land Value ought to have been taken into consideration in the 
assessment. 
F. Possible reasons for the two limbs 
74 It is not easy to discern the legislative purpose or object of the 
statute. Section 2(3) is of local origin135 but there is no mention of such 
legislative purpose or object in Hansard. F A Chua J has suggested that 
the provision is “a last resort formula to be applied when any of the 
 
128 Tai Lai Holdings Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor (1991) 1 MSTC 5076 at 5081. 
129 City Developments Ltd v Chief Assessor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 150 at [9]. 
130 The Legends Fort Canning Park Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2015] SGVRB 1 at [39]. 
131 Wave House Singapore Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2016] SGVRB 1 at [55]. 
132 Singapore Turf Club v Chief Assessor [1983] 2 MLJ cxxxiii. 
133 HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax 
[2018] SGVRB 2 at [30]. 
134 HSBC Trustee (Singapore) Ltd v Chief Assessor and Comptroller of Property Tax 
[2018] SGVRB 2 at [8] and [30]. 
135 Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015) at p 323. 
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methods based on the primary definition is not appropriate”.136 Chao 
Hick Tin J has clarified that the exercise of the option in s 2(3) is not 
limited to cases where other methods of assessment are “impossible” or 
“impractical”.137 However, this relates only to the s 2(3) provision in 
general and does not shed any light on why there are two limbs in the 
provision. 
75 Leung and See provide a plausible suggestion for the need for 
the two limbs. They note that in a relevant case, while land is under 
development, it may be assessed under s 2(3)(b). Upon completion, the 
completed property (comprising the land and the building) will then be 
assessed and the previous assessment will then be deleted. According to 
Leung and See, this is to prevent double assessment.138 It may be 
possible that the purpose behind dividing s 2(3) into two limbs is 
because they catch different situations and Parliament recognised that it 
is necessary to treat properties in such situations differently. 
76 It is noted that generally, the value of a property with buildings 
on it will be higher than that of the vacant land. However, depending on 
the state of repair of the buildings on the property, there may well be 
cases where the vacant land is worth more than the land with buildings 
on it. There is the possibility that Parliament contemplated the 
existence of both cases and wanted to give the Chief Assessor the option 
of assessing the property under the relevant limb of the Statutory 
Formula that would give rise to the higher estimated value.139 
77 There are two separate legal fictions in s 2(3): (a) s 2(3) as a 
whole allows the Chief Assessor to deem the annual value of a property 
as 5% on the estimated value of the property; and (b) s 2(3)(b) requires 
the Chief Assessor to take the estimated value of the land as if it were 
vacant land. It is worth considering the possibility that, given that s 2(3) 
as a whole does itself contain a legal fiction, Parliament could have 
intended for the rebus sic stantibus principle to be disapplied whenever 
s 2(3) as a whole was invoked (and not merely s 2(3)(b)).140 
Unfortunately, there is no real evidence to support this view. The rebus 
sic stantibus principle is a well-established principle and it was always 
 
136 Chief Assessor v National Shipbreakers Pte Ltd [1979–1980] SLR(R) 623 at [32]; also 
see Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 
3rd Ed, 2015) at p 325. 
137 Lee Tat Development (Pte) Ltd v Chief Assessor [1995] 2 SLR(R) 785 at [20]; also see 
Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015) at p 325. 
138 Leung Yew Kwong & See Wei Hwa, Property Tax in Singapore (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 
2015) at p 326. 
139 The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
140 Once again, the author would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for 
encouraging him to consider this issue. 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  
 
open to Parliament to expressly legislate to exclude its application 
whenever s 2(3) was invoked. In the absence of any such expression of 
parliamentary intention, it is submitted that the common law rebus sic 
stantibus principle should apply unless it clearly runs contrary to a 
statutory fiction. In the present case, it only runs contrary to the second, 
but not the first, statutory fiction. 
G. Where deeming provisions run contrary to a statutory fiction 
78 As submitted earlier, the overarching question is whether the 
second limb of the rebus sic stantibus principle runs contrary to any 
statutory fictions. For the sake of completeness, it is noted that s 2(3) is 
not the only section in the PTA to provide for a statutory fiction. Two 
examples of such sections, as supported by case law, will be set out here, 
but several other statutory fictions exist in the PTA.141 
(1) Annual value of a strata lot to be assessed as if it was a freehold 
estate in land 
79 In Aspinden, the Court of Appeal affirmed the applicability of 
the rebus sic stantibus principle in delineating the property to be 
assessed, holding that:142 
34 … Section 2(7) of the PTA did not displace any principle of 
assessment established under the common law. Section 2(7)(b) merely 
provided that the annual value of a strata lot was to be assessed as if it 
was a freehold estate in land. Consequently, the rebus sic stantibus 
principle should still apply in assessing the annual value of the subject 
properties. … 
80 The court also drew a distinction between deeming provisions 
in the PTA that provide for a statutory formula for the assessment of 
annual value (ss 2(3) and 2(5) of the PTA) and those that do not (s 2(7) 
of the PTA), holding that common law principles of valuation such as 
the rebus sic stantibus principle would continue to apply in cases of the 
latter (but, it may be implied, not the former).143 
81 With great respect to the court, it is humbly submitted that this 
broadly phrased principle might be more precisely formulated. It might 
not be the fact that a statutory formula expressly provides for the 
assessment of the annual value in ss 2(3) and 2(5) of the PTA that sets 
them apart from s 2(7) of the PTA, which has no such statutory 
 
141 For example, see ss 2(1A), 2(8) and 2(9) of the Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 
2005 Rev Ed). 
142 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [31]–[34]. 
143 Aspinden Holdings Ltd v Chief Assessor [2006] 4 SLR(R) 521 at [36]. 
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formula. Rather, as submitted earlier, the distinction is likely to be due 
to the fact that in the context of s 2(7) of the PTA, the rebus sic stantibus 
principle does not run contrary to any statutory fiction. It would appear 
that even if ss 2(3) and 2(5) of the PTA are applied, the rebus sic 
stantibus principle would still be applicable in so far as it did not run 
contrary to any statutory fiction. 
(2) Excess land deemed to be vacant land 
82 In The Trustees of the Hokkien Yeo Sze Fund v The Chief 
Assessor,144 the VRB considered the applicability of the rebus sic 
stantibus principle in the context of s 2(5) of the PTA, which provides 
that the value of the “subject property would be assessed at 5% of the 
estimated value of the excess land, which would be deemed to be vacant 
land and thus assessed in accordance with s 2(8) PTA, as if the subject 
property comprised a freehold estate in land”.145 
83 The VRB held that in such a context, the rebus sic stantibus 
principle had no application because it should not override “express 
statutory provision”146 (ie, the statutory fiction). In doing so, it applied 
the unreported VRB decision of Rheem Hume Pte Ltd v Chief 
Assessor,147 which had a similar fact pattern.148 The VRB further 
considered that “the actual use of the land is irrelevant in such a 
determination”.149 
84 With respect to the VRB, it might be phrasing things a little too 
broadly to hold that the rebus sic stantibus principle had no application 
where s 2(5) of the PTA applied, since, as submitted above, even if the 
second limb runs contrary to the statutory fiction, the first limb does 
not and may nevertheless apply. 
V. Conclusion 
85 The discussion in this article focused on the applicability and 
application of the rebus sic stantibus principle in the context of an 
assessment made by the Chief Assessor under s 2(3) of the PTA. It is 
 
144 [2007] SGVRB 3. 
145 The Trustees of the Hokkien Yeo Sze Fund v The Chief Assessor [2007] SGVRB 3 
at [19]. 
146 The Trustees of the Hokkien Yeo Sze Fund v The Chief Assessor [2007] SGVRB 3 
at [18]. 
147 VRB Appeal No 1505/83. 
148 The Trustees of the Hokkien Yeo Sze Fund v The Chief Assessor [2007] SGVRB 3 
at [20]. 
149 The Trustees of the Hokkien Yeo Sze Fund v The Chief Assessor [2007] SGVRB 3 
at [19]. 
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observed that this is merely one manifestation of the overarching 
principle that statutory law generally takes precedence over common 
law rules where they run contrary to each other. 
86 The rebus sic stantibus principle has two limbs and is not a 
single proposition, requiring that property should be valued (a) as it 
stands, and (b) as it is being used and occupied, when the assessment is 
made. Similarly, ss 2(3)(a) and 2(3)(b) of the PTA (and the other 
deeming provisions) are distinct in nature. In considering the 
applicability and application of the rebus sic stantibus principle, one 
should avoid broad generalisations and instead look to the substance of 
the matter on whether and where exactly any conflict between the 
common law and statutory rules might lie. 
87 An examination of the case law in the area suggests that the 
VRB and the Singapore courts may have phrased the proposition a little 
too broadly, denying the applicability of the rebus sic stantibus principle 
where s 2(3) (as opposed to only s 2(3)(b)) is invoked by the Chief 
Assessor. This is understandable because the issue faced by the court in 
each case is often specific to one particular limb of the rebus sic 
stantibus principle (generally the second limb) and one particular 
subsection of s 2(3) of the PTA (generally s 2(3)(b)). It is thus likely that 
the court would not have had its attention drawn to the legal nature of 
the other limb or subsection of the rebus sic stantibus principle and 
s 2(3) of the PTA respectively. It would further appear that in practice, 
in the vast majority of cases, the broad phrasing of the principle has not 
resulted in any injustice, as the courts have largely only disapplied the 
rebus sic stantibus principle in cases where s 2(3)(b) is applied, and not 
in cases where s 2(3)(a) is applied. However, their judgments could 
potentially be read out of context and result in confusion as to the 
correct legal position in this area. 
88 It is hoped that this article will provide a clear conceptual 
breakdown of the relevant concepts in this area and prevent confusion 
arising from potential out-of-context readings of the jurisprudence. It is 
humbly submitted that broad-brushed propositions in this highly 
technical and specific area are to be avoided. 
 
